Credit market freezes in which debt issuance declines dramatically and market liquidity evaporates are typically observed during financial crises. In the financial crisis of 2008-09, the structured credit market froze, issuance of corporate bonds declined, and secondary credit markets became highly illiquid. In this paper we analyze liquidity in bond markets during financial crises and compare two main theories of liquidity in markets: (1) asymmetric information and adverse selection, and (2) heterogenous beliefs. Analyzing the 1873 financial crisis as well as the 2008-09 crisis, we find that when bond value deteriorates, bond illiquidity increases, consistent with an adverse selection model of the information sensitivity of debt contracts. While we show that the adverse-selection model of debt liquidity explains a large portion of the rise in illiquidity, we find little support for the hypothesis that opinion dispersion explains illiquidity in financial crises. ⇤ We thank Bengt Holmström for numerous conversations. We also thank
Introduction
Financial market freezes -by which we mean large declines in the volume of transactions in both the primary and the secondary markets that occur over a non-trivial period of time -are typically observed during financial crises. For example, issuance of corporate, mostly railroad, bonds collapsed during the financial crisis of 1873 and did not resume until 1879. Likewise, there was a considerable decline in bond issuances in the financial crises of 1884, 1893 and 1907. Similar patterns can be observed during the Great Depression when issuance of bonds by industrial firms fell dramatically in 1931 and did not recover until 1935. 1 In particular, issuance of real estate bonds, which accounted for 23% of the total corporate bond issuance in the 1920s, came to a halt in 1929 when the market for such bonds dried-up. Junk bond issuances that boomed in the first half of the 1980s collapsed in 1990 with the market remaining frozen until 1993. The IT revolution led to a boom in issuance of bonds by telecommunication companies which were in-turn purchased and securitized into Collateralized Bond Obligations (CBO). The massive defaults by telecom companies in 2001 and 2002 led to a collapse of the bond securitization market and CBOs have since disappeared. A more recent example of a market freeze took place during the financial crisis of 2008-09 with the collapse of the structured finance market -the largest and fastest growing financial market in the years leading to the crisis. In particular, not only did the market for mortgage-backed securities such as RMBS and CDOs collapse, but also, other, non-housing segments of the structured finance markets -ranging from commercial loans securitizations to asset-backed securities -came to a halt, and even the issuance of corporate bonds declined significantly.
Credit freezes and liquidity dry-ups during financial crises a↵ect secondary markets as well. During the financial crisis of 2008-09 illiquidity in the bond market rose dramatically.
For example, according to Bao, Pan and Wang (2011) , aggregate illiquidity doubled from its pre-crisis levels in August 2007, and tripled in March 2008 , during the collapse of Bear Stearns. By September 2008, during the Lehman Brothers default and the bailout of AIG, bond illiquidity was five times its pre-crisis level. As we show in our analysis below, illiquidity in the bond market also rose sharply in the panic of 1873 -one of the worst financial crises during the National-Bank era. For example, bid-ask spreads doubled from their pre-crisis levels in August 1873 and remained elevated for more than a year. This paper analyzes liquidity in bond markets during financial crises with an emphasis on the most recent crisis of 2008-09. In doing so, we compare two main theories of liquidity in markets: (1) asymmetric information and adverse selection, and (2) heterogenous beliefs.
1 See Benmelech, Frydman and Papanikolaou (2017) .
The classic literature explaining liquidity and frictions in trade between economic agents relies on fundamental insights developed in the information economics literature. As first shown in Akerlof (1970) and Spence (1973) , private information held by economic agents generates adverse selection in which buyers demand discounts reflecting their concern about the negative information held by sellers. Holmström (2012, 2013) and Holmström (2015) apply these insights to develop an asymmetric-information theory of liquidity in bond markets. This is the first theory we test to understand the determinants of liquidity in bond markets during financial crises.
The fundamental insight of Dang, Gorton and Holmström is that the payo↵ structure of debt contracts generates two regions in which bonds will trade. When bond default risk is relatively low, bond payo↵s will be comparatively insensitive to underlying firm value. The value of private information, and hence adverse selection between economic agents, will be relatively low. As a result, when default risk is low, debt is informationally insensitive, and liquidity will be high. In contrast, when default risk rises, the sensitivity of bond value to underlying firm value increases as the firm is nearing its default boundary. Private information in this region is valuable, adverse selection is therefore high, and debt liquidity will decline.
The main prediction of the Dang, Gorton and Holmström model is thus that bond illiquidity will rise as bond value declines, with the bond moving from the informationally insensitive to the informationally sensitive regions.
The second theory of bond liquidity we analyze stems from the literature on heterogeneous beliefs (see, e.g., Harrison and Kreps (1978) , Varian (1989) , and Harris and Raviv (1993) ).
By assuming that agents hold di↵erent fundamental opinions about underlying asset valuessome agents are optimistic while others are pessimistic -the literature on heterogeneous beliefs evades the classic no-trade results in the information economics literature (e.g. Rubinstein (1975), Hakansson et al. (1982) , and Milgrom and Stokey (1982) ). Adverse selection is thus mitigated -indeed, dissipated -by agents' high certainty in the correctness of their own opinion of asset value: agents engage in trade for their own perceived mutual benefit. Di↵erences of opinion can thus promote trade and increase liquidity. Indeed, if agent A values an asset more than agent B, and believes B's valuation to be simply wrong, then agent A does not fear adverse selection in purchasing the asset from B, nor will she require a discount in doing so. Our empirical tests are aimed, therefore, at analyzing to what extent di↵erences of opinion are positively related to liquidity in debt markets during the financial crisis of 2008-09.
One caveat about the theoretical prediction that di↵erences of opinion lead to higher liquidity, is that the theory relies on assumptions regarding the joint distribution of beliefs and endowments. To the extent that opinion dispersion rises in a manner perfectly correlated with the distribution of endowments, it need not be the case that trade and liquidity will rise with the degree of the dispersion. Consider for example a scenario with two agents di↵erentiated by their beliefs about asset value -an optimist and a pessimist -where the optimist owns the asset. If, now, opinion dispersion rises in such a way as to make the optimist even more optimistic and the pessimist more pessimistic, there should be no associated increase in trade or market liquidity. 2 Still, if there are numerous agents, and the changes in agents' opinions are not perfectly aligned with current asset holdings, increased dispersion will facilitate trade.
Before turning to testing the ability of the models to explain liquidity of credit markets during financial crises, we begin by providing descriptive evidence on credit issuance dry-ups.
We collect data on bond issuance during the period surrounding the 1873, 1929 and 2008-09 financial crises. The results show that in all three crises there is a substantial decline in bond issuance during and after the onset of the crisis. While the evidence is consistent with liquidity dry-ups and market freezes during downturns in the spirit of Myers and Majluf (1984) and Lucas and McDonald (1990) , we cannot rule out that the reduction in issuances is driven by lack of corporate demand for credit stemming from a reduction in investment opportunities. Hence, in our main analysis we focus on liquidity in secondary markets -i.e., market liquidity -as opposed to liquidity in primary markets -i.e., funding liquidity. 3
We begin by empirically testing the main prediction of the Dang, Gorton and Holmström model -namely that during financial crises bond illiquidity rises as bond value declines. To operationalize the empirical tests we use standard measures of bond illiquidity for the 1873 and 2008-09 crises. Specifically, we use bid-ask spreads as a measure for bond illiquidity during the 1873 crisis. For the 2008-09 financial crisis we use -the negative covariance of log-price changes in two consecutive periods -that has been proposed by Roll (1984) and has been recently used by Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011) as a measure of bond illiquidity. 4
Using our hand-collected data from the 19th century as well as TRACE data for the 2007-2009 period, we provide graphical evidence that bond illiquidity rises when bond values deteriorates. For example, the correlation between bid-ask spreads and bond prices during the 1873-1876 period is -0.909. Likewise, the correlation between and bond prices during the 2007-2009 period is -0.858. Both correlations are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. We next test the prediction that bond illiquidity rises as bond price declines in financial crises more formally by estimating a regression model in which the dependent variable is 2 In fact, the opposite may hold, as if forced to trade, the optimist will have to sell to the pessimistic agent. 3 For a discussion of the relation between funding liquidity and market liquidity see Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). 4 Our results also hold with alternative measures of illiquidity such as the one proposed in Amihud (2002) .
bond illiquidity and the main explanatory variable is lagged bond price. Our results confirm the negative association between illiquidity and bond prices in both the 1873 and 2008-09 financial crises even after we control for bond and year-by-month fixed-e↵ects. Our evidence confirms the fundamental prediction of the asymmetric-information theory of bond liquidity in Dang, Gorton, and Holmström (2012) : bond illiquidity rises as bond price declines during financial crises.
We continue by analyzing the main prediction of the heterogeneous beliefs theory -i.e., that di↵erences of opinion between economic agents should promote liquidity. Measuring di↵erences of opinion is not trivial as this requires gauging the subjective beliefs of agents engaged in trade. We employ two proxies of di↵erences of opinions in our analysis. The first proxy for di↵erences opinion in debt markets is the absolute value of the di↵erence between the credit rating of Moody's and S&P in notches. 5 Our second measure of opinion heterogeneity is analyst earnings forecast dispersion. Following the literature on analyst forecast dispersion (see, e.g., Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002) ) we calculate for each bond-month in our sample, the ratio of its firm's standard deviation of analysts' current-
fiscal-year annual earnings per share forecasts to the absolute value of the mean analyst forecast.
There are two important caveats to these proxies for opinion dispersion. First, even if the measures accurately capture di↵erences of opinion regarding firm value amongst rating agencies and amongst equity analysts, these measures may not accurately reflect di↵erences of opinion amongst the relevant market participants who are actually trading in the bond markets. Second, it could very well be that incentive structures, career concerns, institutional reputational concerns and the like are influencing earnings forecasts and credit ratings, implying that the actual beliefs of the analysts and rating agencies are di↵erent from those announced to the market. We employ these measures because of their availability, and while they have been used extensively in the literature, we proceed with the analysis with these caveats in mind.
First, we show that the di↵erence of opinion measures rise substantially during the crisis.
The S&P-Moody's credit rating di↵erence, as well as analyst earnings forecast dispersion, spike up post Lehman collapse -both attaining a maximum in March 2009 -before declining.
Taken together with the rise in illiquidity during the crisis described above, the fact that We then run a "horse-race" between the Dang, Gorton, and Holmström asymmetricinformation theory of bond liquidity and the heterogeneous beliefs theory. Estimating regression models relating bond liquidity to bond price as well as the two measures of opinion dispersion, we show that while the relation between illiquidity and price during the 2008-09 financial crisis remains negative and statistically significant, the relation between bond illiquidity and opinion dispersion is not statistically significant once bond price is added as a covariate. 6
We continue by estimating the portion of the aggregate increase in bond illiquidity during the financial crisis that can be explained simply by the reduction in bond prices, i.e., by the main prediction of the Dang, Gorton, and Holmström asymmetric information theory of bond liquidity. Using the estimated coe cients from the regression of illiquidity on lagged bond price, and integrating over the full distribution of changes in bond price, we conclude that between a quarter and a third of the increase in bond illiquidity after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 can be attributed solely to the concurrent reduction in bond prices.
To summarize, our empirical results are consistent with the information asymmetry theory of liquidity as in Dang, Gorton and Holmström (2012) . When bond value deteriorates, bond 6 The fact that the bond rating di↵erence is no longer positively related to illiquidity once bond price is added as a covariate in the regression analysis likely stems from the fact that price and rating di↵erence are negatively related: decreases in bond price are associated with increases in the Moody's-S&P rating di↵erence. Thus, the positive relation between illiquidity and rating di↵erence may simply be reflecting the negative relation between bond price and illiquidity combined with the negative relation between bond price and rating dispersion.
illiquidity increases, as would be predicted by adverse selection stemming from the bond entering a region in which its value is informationally sensitive. The negative relation between bond illiquidity and price explains a large fraction of the rise in illiquidity during the financial crisis, although a sizeable fraction remains unexplained.
In contrast, using two proxies for belief dispersion -the Moody's-S&P di↵erence in bond rating and analyst forecast dispersion -we find little support for the hypothesis that liquidity is enhanced as di↵erences of opinion rise. At the aggregate level, as well as using panel data analysis at the individual bond-level, opinion dispersion did not increase liquidity during the crisis period. If anything, the opposite seems to hold, with illiquidity and dispersion positively related, particularly when using the bond rating di↵erence measure of belief dispersion.
Our results points to a strong link between crises and the dry-ups of market liquidity.
We find that asset prices play a crucial role in determining liquidity in debt markets during financial crises. It is precisely when prices decline market-wide, that liquidity dries-up and issuance of new liabilities becomes di cult, reducing the supply of capital for firms already pushed into distress due to the crisis. Illiquidity in credit markets can have dire consequences for households as well. Precautionary savings in the form of fixed-income securities become hard to sell and households in need of liquid funds may find liquidity di cult to obtain precisely when they need it most.
These results have implications for the e cacy of monetary interventions meant to strengthen the economy during downturns through increased lending by the financial sector. In particular, the asymmetric information theory of liquidity suggests that if these interventions occur when borrower balance sheets are weak, liquidity will not easily flow from the financial sector into the economy. Weak borrower balance sheets will imply that issued liabilities will be informationally sensitive, limiting borrowers' ability to raise debt capital. Monetary interventions meant to inject liquidity from the financial sector into the real economy can thus arrive "too late". In contrast, monetary interventions that occur at an earlier stage -when balance sheets are still su ciently strong that liabilities issued by borrowers are relatively informationally insensitive -will have a larger e↵ect. As a corollary, if monetary interventions are rendered ine↵ective because they arrive too late in the cycle, the asymmetric information theory of liquidity suggests that fiscal policy may be e↵ective in complementing monetary policy. In particular, strengthening borrower balance sheets directly through fiscal policy shifts corporate liabilities into a less informationally sensitive region in which monetary interventions meant to increase lending become e↵ective. 7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents evidence on credit issuance freezes in three financial crises. Section 2 provides evidence on liquidity and informational sensitivity in financial crises. Section 3 evaluates the explanatory power of belief dispersion for liquidity in financial crises. Section 4 studies the explanatory power of bond prices in explaining illiquidity during the 2008-09 crisis. Section 5 concludes.
Funding Illiquidity During Financial Crises
We define credit market freezes as large declines in the volume of transactions in both primary and secondary credit markets that occur over a non-trivial period of time. This section provides descriptive evidence on credit market issuance freezes during the financial crises of 1873, 1929, and 2008-09.
Credit Issuance Freezes in Three Financial Crises
The most recent example of a credit market freeze took place during the financial crisis of 2008-09 with the collapse of the structured finance market -the largest and fastest growing credit market in the years leading to the crisis. Issuance of structured finance securities and especially collateralized debt obligations (CDO) grew dramatically between 2003 and 2006.
While the year 2007 was on track to surpass the record numbers of 2006, the credit crisis that began in summer 2007 brought the market for structured finance to a halt. 8 The collapse of the securitzation market is well illustrated in Figure 1 which uses issuance data to illustrate the dramatic decline in issuance of non-agency mortgage securities from 2005 to 2010. 9 Not only did the market for Mortgage-Backed Securities such as RMBS and CDOs collapse, but also other, non-housing segments of the structured finance markets ranging from commercial loans securitizations (CLO) to asset-backed securities (ABS) came to a halt and even the issuance of corporate bonds declined significantly. Figure 2 demonstrates that issuance of non-mortgage asset-backed securities collapsed during the crisis and stayed at a low level in the following years. The decline in the volume of bond issuance was not confined only to securitized assets. Figure 3 shows that issuance of corporate bonds also declined considerably in 2008 and returned to its pre-crisis level only in 2010.
We now turn to another credit market freeze that took place during the financial crisis of 1873. The crisis of 1873 is one of the classic international crises according to Kindleberger (1990) . It is also one of Sprague's (1910) four crises of the U.S. National Banking era that eventually led to the creation of the Federal Reserve in 1914. The 1873 crisis is traditionally viewed as a classic banking panic triggered by the failure of commercial banks linked to the railroad industry. In turn, the crisis heralded a six year recession according to the NBER business cycle reference dates. We collect information on issuance of bonds, mostly by railroad companies, for the years 1869-1874 from the Commercial and Financial Chronicle (CFC) -a weekly business publication that was first published in 1865 and reported detailed business news as well as detailed prices of bonds and stocks. Figure 4 displays the volume of corporate bonds issuance from 1869 to 1874. As Figure 4 demonstrates, bond issuances declined dramatically in 1873 and 1874 compared to their level in 1870 and 1871. While we do not have detailed information on bond issuance after 1874, contemporary observers of the 1873 financial crisis have argued that bond issuance collapsed during the financial crisis of 1873 and did not resume until 1879.
We provide additional evidence on credit issuance freezes from the financial crisis of 1929.
The crisis began on October 1929 with a crash of the stock market that marked the beginning of the Great Depression. According to Mishkin (1991) :
The outcome of the panic period starting October 23 and culminating in the crash on October 29 was a negative return for the month of October of close to 20%.
This was the largest monthly negative return in the stock market up to that time. 10 and accounted for 23% of the total corporate bond issuance. As Figure 6 illustrates, and consistent with evidence in Figure 1 for the 2008-09 financial crisis, real estate bond issuance collapsed during the crisis with the market for these bonds all but disappearing. 10 Mishkin (1991) p. 93. 11 The data is based on Table 52 in Hickman (1960) . 12 The data is based on Johnson (1936a and 1936b) .
Our results show that in all three crises there is a substantial decline in bond issuance during and after the onset of the crisis. The evidence is consistent with liquidity dry-ups and market freezes during downturns in the spirit of Myers and Majluf (1984) and Lucas and McDonald (1990) . Still, we cannot rule out that the reduction in issuances is driven by a lack of corporate demand for credit stemming from a reduction in investment opportunities.
We next turn to provide suggestive evidence on credit market freezes in secondary markets in which market liquidity dries-up. Providing such evidence requires information on prices of bonds in secondary markets which we have collected for two notable financial crises: the 1873 financial crisis and the more recent 2008-09 crisis.
Liquidity and Informational Sensitivity
Liquidity is a notoriously ambiguous concept. By liquidity in secondary markets, we are referring to what is commonly known as "market liquidity" -i.e., the ease with which assets are traded (see, e.g., Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) ). In our analysis we employ two measures of market liquidity common in the literature -and Bid-Ask spreads which we define below. In particular, we do not focus on volume of trade as a measure of liquidity, since exogenous variation in the demand for funds is likely to play an important role in determining agents' need to sell their asset holdings -particularly during financial crisesirrespective of the ease with which assets are traded. Put di↵erently, trading volume may be high not because markets are liquid, but because investors require funding.
The Financial Crisis of 1873
We collect weekly information from the CFC on prices of corporate -mostly railroadbonds from January 1873 up to the end of June 1876. The data include the name of the security, the issuing firm, and the bid and ask prices that prevailed for each security during the week. There are 69,444 bond-week observations in our dataset. The CFC reports bid or ask prices for 56,717 bond-week observations, and 12,727 bond-week observations do not have pricing information, suggesting that these bonds were not traded during the week in which the information is not reported. We begin our analysis by calculating an index of bid-ask spreads for bonds that have information on both bid and ask prices. We define the relative bid-ask spread for bond i in week w as:
where M id price i,w is defined as (Ask i,w + Bid i,w )/2. Next we calculate Spread t as an equal-weighed time-series average of Spread i,w across bonds and within a month t. Figure 7 presents the monthly evolution of the bid-ask spread from January 1873 to June 1876. As the figure shows clearly, bid-ask spread increased from 0.052 in August 1873 to 0.060 in September 1873 when the crisis started and 0.063 in October 1873. As the financial crisis intensified with more failures of banks and railroad companies, the bid-ask spread reached 0.099 -almost twice as high as its level before the crisis. Figure 7 also displays the evolution of the mean bond mid-price using the data we have collected from the CFC. As Figure 7 shows, the decline in bond prices is associated with higher bid-ask spreads -indicating that the bond market became less liquid as bonds' prices declined. The correlation between the bid-ask spread and mean bond price is -0.909 and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
We argue that the evidence from the 1873 financial crisis is consistent with Dang, Gorton and Holmström model of the e↵ect of the information-sensitivity of debt on liquidity and liquidity dry-ups in debt markets. The main prediction of the model is that that when underlying values deteriorates, debt shifts from being informationally insensitive and becomes informational sensitive, adverse selection problems rise, and liquidity drops. We now turn to conduct similar analysis of the relation between bond prices and market liquidity during the financial crisis of 2008-09.
The Financial Crisis of 2008-09
We use bond-pricing data from FINRA's TRACE (Transaction Reporting and Compliance Engine). Our initial sample is similar to the one we use in Benmelech and Bergman (2017) and includes all corporate bonds traded in TRACE. We keep bonds with a time-to-maturity of at least six months and standard coupon intervals (including zero-coupon bonds). Our sample is comprised of 'plain-vanilla' corporate bonds -we do not include securitized assets in the sample and exclude bonds that are issued by financial firms, as well as convertible, putable, and fixed-price callable bonds.
As a measure of illiquidity we use, , which is defined as the negative covariance of log-price changes in two consecutive periods: 13 = Cov( p t , p t 1 ). 
Regression Analysis of Bond Prices and Liquidity During Financial Crises
Our graphical evidence for the financial crisis of 1873 and 2008-09 suggests that bond prices and bond liquidity are negatively correlated during financial crises. We next test the prediction that bond illiquidity rises as bond price declines in financial crises more formally by estimating the following baseline specification:
where Illiquidity is either for the 2007-2009 period or the normalized bid-ask spread Spread i,t for the 1873-1876 period, subscripts indicate bond (i) and either month (for 2007-2009) or week (for 1873-1876) (t), P rice i,t 1 is bond price, t is a vector of either year or year⇥month fixed e↵ects, ✓ i is a vector of bond fixed e↵ects -and ✏ i,t is the regression residual.
We report the results from estimating variants of regression 3 in Table 1 . Tables throughout this paper report regression coe cients and standard errors clustered at the bond level (in parentheses The results reported in Column 1 are based on regression 3, which is estimated with year and bond fixed e↵ects. There is a negative association between illiquidity and bond prices, suggesting that bonds with lower prices are more illiquid (high ). We obtain very similar results when we include year⇥month -instead of just year -and bond fixed e↵ects (Column 2). The association between and bond price remains negative and significant at the 1% level when we control for bond fixed e↵ects. Likewise, Column 3 shows that bid-ask spreads are negatively correlated with bond prices during the 1873-1876 period after controlling for bond and year fixed-e↵ects. Column 4 repeats the analysis presented in Column 3 and adds year⇥month fixed-e↵ects. The results are statistically significant at the 1 percent level, suggesting that bonds that experienced lower prices during the 1873 financial crisis also became less liquid. An important concern regarding the negative relation between bond illiquidity and bond price is one of reverse causality. Rather than declines in bond values causing illiquidity to rise, it could be that bond prices are declining due to an expected (future) reduction in bond liquidity. In Benmelech and Bergman (2017) we conduct detailed analysis to address this endogeneity concern, using instrumental variables and non-linearities around the default boundary.
Liquidity and Belief Dispersion During the Financial Crisis
A large literature discusses how heterogeneous beliefs can promote trade and liquidity in financial markets (see, e.g., Harrison and Kreps (1978) , Varian (1989) , and Harris and Raviv, (1993) ). This literature provides an alternative theory to trade than that provided by classic asymmetric information and adverse selection theories (Akerlof (1970) and Spence (1973) Hakansson et al. (1982) , and Milgrom and Stokey (1982) ). Agents engage in trade for their own perceived mutual benefit. In this section we analyze the relation between di↵erences of opinion and liquidity in the bond market.
Measuring heterogeneous beliefs among market participants is clearly challenging. To test the heterogeneous beliefs theory we use two imperfect measures to proxy for di↵erences of opinion in market participants' assessment of the future value of bonds during the financial crisis. The first measure is the di↵erence between the S&P and Moody's bond credit rating, and is defined as:
Since there is a direct correspondence between the Moody's and S&P rating systems, we simply calculate for each bond and month the (absolute value) notch di↵erence between the Moody's credit rating and the S&P credit rating. Credit rating data are taken from Mergent FISD.
The second measure of di↵erences of opinion employed in our analysis is analyst earnings forecast dispersion. approximately nine percent of bond-months exhibit a rating di↵erence of two notches, and two percent of the sample exhibits a di↵erence of three notches or more. Table 3 provides the distribution of analyst earnings forecast dispersion. As can be seen, the median ratio of earnings forecast dispersion -i.e. the ratio of standard deviation to mean analyst forecastsis 0.03, with a 75th percentile of 0.084. Figures 10 and 11 protray the evolution of dispersion of opinion over the crisis using the two di↵erences of opinion variables. As can be seen in Figure 10 , analyst earnings forecast dispersion increased greatly following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, with median forecast dispersion more than doubling from 0.024 in September 2008 to its peak of 0.077 in March
Liquidity and Belief Dispersion: Descriptive Evidence
2009. The figure clearly shows that earnings forecast dispersion is seasonal, with a yearly frequency. This seasonality arises due to the fact that dispersion is calculated each month with respect to the (fiscal) year end earnings forecasts. This dispersion will naturally decline towards the latter part of the year, as the time until the earnings report shortens. The fact that the dispersion measure is calculated with respect to the end of year forecast also explains why the large rise in the measure occurs not immediately after Lehman's collapse in September 2008, but rather early in 2009. Figure 11 depicts the evolution of the Moody's-S&P bond rating di↵erence over the crisis.
Here we see a spike in the bond rating di↵erence at the end of 2007, and another larger spike post-Lehman (with a lag as bond ratings take time to adjust). The Moody's-S&P rating di↵erence rises from a mean value of 0.54 in September 2008, to a peak of 0.78 in March 2009. 17 Bond rating di↵erences decline by August 2009 and remain relatively constant thereafter, but at a level higher than that of early 2007. Indeed, in January 2010, the mean credit rating di↵erence is 0.67.
Figures 10 and 11 also present the evolution of monthly (par-value-weighted) mean bond illiquidity, as proxied by the illiquidity measure. As discussed above, illiquidity sharply rose during the crisis. We note that the concurrent rise of illiquidity and rise of our proxies for di↵erences of opinions during the crisis provides prima facie evidence against the hypothesis that heterogeneous beliefs promote liquidity. Figure 12 shows that illiquidity rises with credit 17 It is interesting to note that the two measures of opinion dispersion, calculated from two di↵erent markets (equity and debt) and two di↵ering sets of market participants (rating agencies and equity analysts), attain their maximum value during the crisis in the same month -March 2009. The time-series correlation between the mean forecast dispersion and the mean rating di↵erence is 0.47.
An Empirical Analysis of the Relation between Liquidity and

Belief Dispersion
18 Recall that only approximately 1% of the sample has a bond rating of 4 or more.
rating dispersion and particularly so for bond rating di↵erences of three notches or more.
Similarly, Figure 13 shows that illiquidity rises with higher analyst forecast dispersion. Similar to Figure 12 , the increase in illiquidity is most pronounced for the top two deciles of forecast dispersion.
Moving to regression analysis, Table 4 regresses on indicator variables defined over the Moody's-S&P bond rating di↵erences. 19 Importantly, the regression is run with bond and
year-by-month fixed e↵ects to absorb non-time varying bond determinants of illiquidity, as well as market-wide variation in illiquidity during the crisis. Identification is thus obtained by comparing the illiquidity of two bonds with di↵erent measures of the Moody's-S&P spread in the same month and year (as compared to each bond's mean illiquidity).
As can be seen in Table 4 , increased credit rating di↵erences between Moody's and S&P is associated with higher bond illiquidity. Di↵erence of opinion, as captured by bond rating divergence, does not seem to promote liquidity, as would be predicted by the heterogeneous beliefs literature. The economic e↵ect is substantial: Controlling for year and month-by-bond fixed e↵ects, as compared to bonds with no disagreement between Moody's and S&P rating, bonds where the respective ratings di↵er by three notches exhibit a illiquidity measure that is higher by 1.26 units, representing approximately 70% of the mean during the crisis. Bonds with a four notch divergence in ratings exhibit a illiquidity measure that is higher by 3.03 units, or 165% of mean . Table 5 runs the analogous regression using indicator variables defined over the quintiles of analyst forecast dispersion. As can be seen, the relation between analyst forecast dispersion and bond illiquidity is generally weak, but the highest quintile of forecast dispersion exhibits substantially larger illiquidity than the lowest quintile of earnings forecast dispersion: with bond and year-by-month fixed e↵ects, the di↵erence between the two quintiles is 0.318, or approximately 250% of the mean level of illiquidity.
Although the positive relation between analyst forecast dispersion and bond illiquidity is not supportive of the heterogeneous beliefs theory, we cannot rule out that endogeneity, and in particular omitted variables, are biasing our results. Indeed, one potential explanation for the positive relation between belief dispersion and illiquidity is that dispersion in beliefs Figure 15 , which depicts the evolution of average bond rating di↵erences by bond credit rating groups, sorts the bonds based on the higher between the Moody's and S&P credit rating. The figures depict the monthly par-value weighted average opinion dispersion measure. As can be seen, lower rated bonds (rating category 4) exhibit the sharpest rise in opinion dispersion during the crisis. In addition, Figure 15 shows a substantial increase in the rating dispersion for the highest credit rating.
This is a result of Moody's, but not S&P, downgrading Aaa rated bonds.
To further understand the relation between bond prices and opinion dispersion, Table   6 regresses the change in opinion dispersion -either Moody's-S&P credit rating di↵erence or analyst forecast dispersion -on the change in bond price. As can be seen, di↵erence of opinion, as proxied by bond rating di↵erences, rise when bond price declines, although the e↵ect is not economically large: a one standard deviation decline in bond price increases bond rating dispersion by approximately 2.5 percent of the mean rating dispersion (Column 1).
However, calculating the e↵ect over bond-month observations where the illiquidity measure is not missing -i.e. the sample over which the relation between illiquidity, bond price, and opinion dispersion is analyzed -triples this economic magnitude, to approximately 7.5 percent of the mean rating di↵erence. The last two columns of Table 6 analyze the relation between analyst forecast dispersion and bond price, showing that it is not statistically significant.
Asymmetric Informational and Belief Dispersion: A Horse
Race Table 7 conducts a "horserace" between the two theories of bond illiquidity: the asymmetric information theory which predicts that illiquidity should decline with bond price and the heterogeneous beliefs theory, which predicts that di↵erences of opinion promote liquidity.
Specifically, the specifications in the table relate the measure of bond illiquidity to price as well as to indicator variables defined over the di↵erent levels of bond rating di↵erence. As usual, all regressions are run with bond and year-by-month fixed e↵ects. As can be seen in Table 7 , illiquidity as measured by is still negatively related to bond price -consistent with the asymmetric information theory of liquidity of debt (as in Dang, Gorton and Holmström (2012) ) and the results above. However, as the second column of the dispersion is no longer related to illiquidity in a statistically significant manner once bond price and bond-by-year fixed e↵ects are included.
In a similar manner, Table 8 regresses the illiquidity measure on both bond price and analyst forecast dispersion. As in Table 7 , bond price is still negatively related to bond illiquidity, but di↵erences of opinion, as proxied by analyst forecast dispersion, is not related to in a statistically significant manner.
In sum, our results are consistent with the information asymmetry theory of liquidity as in Dang, Gorton and Holmström (2012) . In contrast, using two proxies for belief dispersion -the To fix ideas, Figure 16 and 17 To understand the role of bond price deterioration in explaining the behavior of bondmarket liquidity during the crisis, we first regress bond illiquidity (proxied by ) on twenty indicator variables defined over twenty equal-sized bins of lagged bond price, running the following specification:
where Illiquidity is , for bond i in month t. PriceBin is a set of twenty indicator variables based on (within-year) twenty equal sized bins of bond price -P riceBin k i,t 1 equals one if bond i is in price bin k at month t 1. 22 b i is a vector of bond fixed-e↵ects, and c t is a vector of either year or year⇥month fixed-e↵ects. 23 Standard errors are clustered at the bond level.
Using the regression coe cients, we calculate for each bond in each month in our sample the predicted illiquidity of that bond based on the bond's price. We calculate the market-level predicted illiquidity by calculating the par-value weighted average across all bonds. Figure 18 presents for each month t the change in predicted (weighted-average) bond-market illiquidity from January 2007 to month t, together with the actual change in the weighted average bond-market illiquidity. The figure uses a regression specification which does not include bond fixed e↵ects. Figure 19 displays the analogous predicted change in bond-market illiquidity but uses the regression specification which includes bond fixed e↵ects.
As can be seen, predicted and actual changes in illiquidity track each other closely up to late 2007 (i.e. pre-crisis) and from the first quarter of 2010 and on. In the interim period, the increase in actual illiquidity is higher than the predicted increase stemming solely from the decline in bond prices. Still, the leftward shift in the distribution of bond prices, in and of itself, can explain between a quarter and a third of the increase of the rise in actual bond market illiquidity during the crisis.
Conclusion
This paper analyzes illiquidity in bond markets during financial crises and compares two main theories of liquidity in markets: (1) asymmetric information and adverse selection, and
(2) heterogenous beliefs. We find that when bond value deteriorates, bond illiquidity increases, consistent with an adverse selection model of the information sensitivity of debt contracts as in Dang, Holmström (2012, 2013) and Holmström (2015) . In contrast, we find little support for the hypothesis that opinion dispersion explains illiquidity in financial crises. Our results point to a strong link between crises and the dry-ups of market liquidity and have implications for the e cacy of monetary interventions that are designed to boost lending by the financial sector. 22 The first price bin represents bonds with the lowest price. 23 Note that with the inclusion of bond fixed e↵ects, the regression is identified o↵ of changes over time in the level of illiquidity and bond price for each bond.
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